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INTRODUCTION
Rights have costs. Sometimes those costs are borne by the government. This
happens most obviously when the government has to spend money to protect the
exercise of a right or to punish violators of it. But sometimes exercising a right
entails costs that fall on individuals who do not benefit directly from the right in
question. And when this happens-when a right imposes costs not on the
government or on the public more generally, but on particular third parties-it is
especially important to ask about the limits of the right and about the extent to
which third parties can be asked to bear the costs of its exercise.
In the context of rights to religious liberty and freedom of conscience,
questions about costs to third parties have been the subject of controversy in recent
years. In prior work, we have argued that when the government accommodates
religious believers, it may not impose undue hardship on identifiable third parties.3
This is sometimes called the third-party harm doctrine. Our argument has been
that this doctrine is both normatively justified and grounded in constitutional
sources, namely, in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Indeed, it
should be no surprise that political morality and constitutional law point in the
2 See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COSTS OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
3 See NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 49-70 (2017); Nelson
Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do Relgious Accommodations Burden
Others? in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY,
AND EQUALITY 328-46 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter When Do];
Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, How Much May Rehgious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215-
39 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter How Much]; Micah Schwartzman,
Richard Schragger, & Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate,
BLOGSPOT: BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-
establishment-clause-and.html; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman,
Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part I: What Counts as a Burden on Employces?
BLOGSPOT: BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-
lobby-and-establishment-clause.html; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, & Nelson
Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part III: Reconciling Amos and Cutter,
BLOGSPOT: BALKINIZATION (Dec. 6, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-
and-establishment-clause_9.html [hereinafter Reconciling Amos]; Nelson Tebbe, Richard
Schragger, & Micah Schwartzman, Reply to McConnell on Hobby Lobby and the Establishment
Clause, BLOGSPOT: BALKINIZATION (March 30, 2014), https://balkin.blogspotcom/2014/03/reply-
to-mcconnell-on-hobby-lobby-and.html; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, & Nelson Tebbe, Holt v.
Hobbes and Third Party Harms, BLOGSPOT: BALKINIZATION (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-hobbs-and-third-party-harms.html [hereinafter Holt].
Our work builds on Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from
the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Relgion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 343 (2014) [hereinafter RFRA Exemptions]; see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G.
Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 323 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter Of
Burdens].
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same direction. The idea that rights are limited when they impose undue burdens
on third parties is both morally intuitive and a familiar part of our constitutional
tradition.
Nevertheless, critics of the third-party harm doctrine have raised a variety of
objections. They have argued that the doctrine lacks normative foundations, that it
is not grounded in constitutional sources,5 that it assumes an incorrect baseline for
determining when third parties are harmed,' and that it cannot be applied without
eliminating all, or nearly all, religious accommodations.7 Although these four
objections have received the most attention so far, critics have also argued that the
third-party harm doctrine does not apply when the government provides legal
exemptions not only for religion but also for secular claims of conscience. More
specifically, when the government recognizes both religious and secular grounds for
conscientious objection, it does not treat religion distinctively and so it does not
trigger constitutional scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Finally, some have
objected that religious freedom is like other fundamental rights that impose harms
on others.' Consider, for example, the freedom of speech, the right to keep and
4 See, e.g., Kathleen Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party Harms: Constitutional
Values and Limits, 106 KY. L.J. 717 (2018); Christopher Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party
Harms, and the False Analogy to Church Taxes, 106 KY. L.J. 679 (2018); Mark Storslee, Religious
Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019) (on file with authors).
' See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the
Establishment Clause Violated?, 59 J. CHURCH & ST. 357 (2016); Thomas C. Berg, Religious
Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, 17 FED. Soc. REV. 50 (2016) [hereinafter Religious
Exemptions]; Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 103 (2015); Marc 0. DeGirolami, Free Excrcise byMoonhght, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105
(2016); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of Relgion, 67 VAND. L.
REv. EN BANC 45 (2014).
6 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Would Granting an Exemption from the Employer Mandate Violate the
Establishment Clause?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:11 PM) http://volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-
granting-exemption-employer-mandate-violate-establishment-clause/; K vin C. Walsh, A Baselne Problem
for the "Burden on Employees" Argument against RFRA-Based Exemptions from the Contraceptives
Mandate, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/01/a-baseline-problem-for-the-burden-on-
employees-argument-against-rfra-based-exemptions-from-the-contr.html; Marc 0.
DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate
Violate the Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-
not-violate-the-establishment-clause.html.
' See, e.g., Marc 0. DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs and the Third-Party-Harm Establishment Clause
Theory, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
mirrorofjustice/2014/10/where-has-the-establishment-clause-third-party-harm-argument-gone.html;
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1375, 1383-84 (2016).
s See, e.g., Hillel Y. Levin, Why Some Religious Accommodations for Mandatory Vaccinations
Violate the Establishment Clause, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 1193 (2017).
9 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 5, at 358 n.7; Lund, supra note 7, at 1384-85; Eugene Volokh, Prof
Michael McConnell (Stanford) on the Hobby Lobby Arguments, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
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bear arms, or the right against unreasonable search and seizure. The exercise of all
of these rights imposes costs on third parties, but those costs are not taken as
reasons to limit the substantive content of the attendant rights. According to this
objection, the fact that religious freedom entails costs for third parties gives courts
no more reason to restrict the government's ability to provide religious
accommodations.
In this symposium contribution, we respond to these objections and argue that
none of them is persuasive. The last two objections-that the third-party harm
doctrine does not apply to general conscience-based exemptions a d that all rights
have costs-are noteworthy, however, because they raise fundamental questions
about the nature of constitutional rights and about the limits of freedom of
conscience. Although such objections do not require us to abandon or diminish the
third-party harm doctrine, responding to them provides an opportunity to develop
the doctrine in ways that illuminate religious freedom, liberty of conscience, and
other rights that impose costs on others.
I. NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
A preliminary objection to the third-party harm doctrine is that it lacks
normative foundations. Elsewhere, we have defended the principle of avoiding
harm to others by drawing an analogy to taxpayer criticisms of compelled support
for religion. In his contribution to this symposium, Christopher Lund questions
this analogy, asking whether it can provide support for the third-party harm
doctrine.'0 We respond by reviewing the analogy and explaining why we believe it
holds.
During the founding era, taxpayers who were forced to support churches argued
that government had violated a fundamental liberty." James Madison opposed
Virginia's bill to support churches through taxation on the ground that it would
violate the freedom of conscience.12 Being compelled to pay even "three pence" to
support an establishment is intolerable, he argued in his successful campaign to
defeat the bill.' 3 And when Thomas Jefferson famously remarked that protecting
CONSPIRACY (March 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/prof-michael-mcconnell-stanford-on-the-hobby-lobby-
arguments/?utmterm=. 15b9795ea542 (providing commentary from Professor Michael McConnell).
10 Lund, supra note 4, at 740-43.
" See id. at 52; see also Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 3, at 362-63; Micah Schwartzman,
Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 330-31 (2011).
12 See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Rehgious Assessments, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 30 (Jack N. Rackove ed., 1999).
13 Id. at 31 ('Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in
exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence
only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other
establishment in all cases whatsoever?").
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religious freedom "neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg," he implicitly called
into question situations where accommodating believers did affect his basic
interests as a citizen.'4 Today, similarly, members of the polity have an argument
that their First Amendment interests have been implicated when their funds are
directed by the government to causes they oppose as a matter of conscience." That
is true even though they have no similar cause for complaint when their dollars are
used to pursue policies they oppose as a matter of political preference.
In addition to concerns about liberty of conscience, early taxation to support
churches drew objections based on the value of political equality. The government
taxed citizens to fund religious education by churches, and that violated a basic
commitment to equal status among all members of the polity. As Madison put it,
taxation to support certain churches "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all
those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority."'6 Accommodations that shift government burdens from some believers
to others implicate a similar interest in equal standing.
The church-tax analogy thus indicates two main justifications for the third-
party harm doctrine. First, there is the imperative of protecting citizens from
government coercion that implicates a fundamental liberty. Citizens who bear costs
so that others may observe their faith can rightfully complain that their liberty of
conscience has been implicated. And second, the analogy draws attention to values
of equal citizenship. When particular individuals are asked to bear the costs of
others' conscientious objections, they have a further complaint, which is that they
are being disfavored by the government.
Now, in his contribution to this volume, Christopher Lund argues that the
third-party harm doctrine cannot be supported by an analogy to the founding-era
prohibition on taxation to support churches.'7 He reasons that our interpretation of
the analogy proves too much, because it requires opposing even "three pence" of
harm, whereas many accommodations of religion are widely accepted even though
they impose costs on taxpayers. For example, providing kosher meals to observant
inmates reduces the public fisc, but nobody believes that it is unconstitutional for
that reason. He reconciles this example by arguing that the church tax precedent
stands for the proposition that taxpayers may not be forced to support policies that
'4 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 285
(Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 1984). See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870 (2000) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]ompelling an individual to support religion violates the fundamental principle of
freedom of conscience. Madison's and Jefferson's now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of
personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means that the
government can compel no aid to fund it.").
15 That is not to say that citizens' interests cannot be overcome by countervailing government
objectives. See Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 346-57.
16 Madison, supra note 12, at 33. He also had in mind the fact that the Virginia bill exempted
certain denominations from the tax, but not others.
17 Lund, supra note 4, at 740. See Storslee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 17) (containing a similar
critique of our use of the church tax analogy); see also id (manuscript at 19 n.79) (citing this article).
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advance religion, but they may be forced to support policies that lift burdens on
relgious freedom. Lund concludes that our analogy does not support the doctrine
of avoiding harm to others. After all, we are concerned with accommodations of
religious freedom and not with affirmative support for churches.
While we agree that Lund's interpretation of the church-tax analogy is
important, we nevertheless believe that the example is better interpreted to support
the principle against harm to others. Affirmative support for churches is always
constitutionally problematic, whether or not it causes specific third-party harms.
But first, the line between lifting burdens and providing affirmative support is often
unclear, and part of the work of legal doctrine is to determine when the former
shades into the latter. And second, even when the state is clearly lifting burdens, it
cannot impose the costs of that lifting on a specific person or group. There is a
meaningful difference between taxing the public to support a religious exemption
and burdening a group of citizens in order to accommodate the religious beliefs of
another group.'" To see it more clearly, consider three hypothetical examples:
(1) Government taxes the public to fund a church's core mission.
(2) Government taxes the public to provide kosher meals to Jewish inmates.
(3) Government taxes nonreligious inmates to provide kosher meals to Jewish
inmates.
Lund wants to insist that there is a difference between (1), which is similar to
the Virginia assessment controversy, and (2), the kosher inmate example. We
agree. Lund is right to say that (2) is normatively unproblematic because
government is protecting religious freedom rather than benefitting religion.9
Imposing costs on the public in order to accommodate the religious liberty of
minorities does not usually raise moral difficulties. 20 But that does not mean that
the tax in (3) is normatively permissible. Nor do we agree with Lund that our
intuitions about the church-tax in (1) are irrelevant to our view about the tax
imposed on nonreligious inmates in (3). Let us explain why.
When the public as a whole is taxed to accommodate the beliefs or practices of
a minority, as in example (2), conscience is less clearly implicated. Taxpayers have
no reason to complain if the government uses their funds to lift burdens on a
's This is a distinction that others have drawn as well. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel,
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Rehgion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516,
2524 (2015).
'9 Sometimes it may be difficult to tell the difference, because distinguishing between government
benefits and government lifting of burdens can raise baseline problems, as we discuss below in Part III.
But regardless, Lund is right to say that the difference matters.
Storslee misses the distinction between (1) and (2) when he argues: "Yet if the problem with cost-
shifting accommodations is that they function like religious taxes, it is difficult to see why using actual
tax money to pay for accommodations is any less objectionable." Storslee, supra note 4 (manuscript at
29). It is not, for the reasons we give in the text.
20 The Court upheld such a religious accommodation against an Establishment Clause challenge in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2004), and there the Court was dealing precisely with
exemptions for religious inmates. We discuss Cutter in Part II infra.
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religious minority, provided the government is not advancing religion but
protecting religious freedom, which is a secular good. Equality is not abridged
insofar as the social meaning of that exemption is government concern for religious
liberty, rather than government favoritism. The play between the joints of free
exercise and nonestablishment permits a certain degree of accommodation.
When the government burdens a subset of the population, however, difficulties
do arise. And those difficulties make example (2) different from (3). Start with
liberty of conscience. When costs are imposed on everyone, citizens have no reason
to complain because the government is not coercing them in a way that implicates
their rights of conscience, as we argued above. But when those costs fall on a
discrete group of citizens, they can rightly complain that they are being coerced as a
matter of conscience.2' Now consider equality interests, which are directly
implicated. Citizens who are selectively burdened can complain that the
government is preferring one group over another on account of their conscientious
or religious beliefs. When one group is "taxed" so that another group may be
accommodated in their observance, citizens are stratified on the basis of belief. Our
conclusion is that fundamental interests are implicated when one group of citizens
is asked to bear a burden so that another's religious or conscientious objection may
be accommodated, as in example (3), even though those interests are not implicated
when the public as a whole bears the cost, as in example (2).22
Moreover, example (1) supports our conclusion about (3). The Virginia
assessment controversy can be understood to mean that liberty and equality with
respect to matters of conscience are fundamental, and that they can be offended
when citizens must bear the costs of others' conscientious claims. Our
interpretation of the church tax example works differently from Lund's-we infer
liberty and equality principles from the example, and then we apply them to
discrete third-party harms-but it works just as well. And it better matches
Madison's arguments in opposition to Virginia's proposed tax to support churches,
which continue to resonate as grounds for rejecting compelled support for others'
religious practices.
21 Interestingly, under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, compelled support doctrine
observes a similar distinction. When the government taxes the general population to fund its speech,
taxpayers can have no objection. That is the holding ofJohanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550
(2005). But when the government uses an excise tax to require particular people to pay for the speech of
other people, courts have found that the taxpayers' free speech interests may be implicated. SeeJanus v.
AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018) (striking down compelled support for union's speech and
quoting Jefferson's Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom); id at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(comparing the arrangement to "levying a tax to support collective bargaining"); see also Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (industry advertising); Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (student organizations); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496
U.S. 1 (1990) (state bar associations); Schwartzman, supra note 11, at 359-71 (discussing freedom of
conscience under compelled support doctrine and the Establishment Clause).
22 That is why the Cutter court also said that accommodating religious inmates would be
unconstitutional if the costs fell on secular inmates or other nonbeneficiaries. 544 U.S. at 720.
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II. LEGAL DOCTRINE
After concerns about its normative foundations, the most fundamental
objection to the third-party harm doctrine is that the doctrine is not supported by
constitutional sources under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. This
objection faces an uphill battle because the Supreme Court has explicitly
and repeatedly recognized that the Establishment Clause limits statutory
religious accommodations that impose burdens on third parties. In Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor,23 the Supreme Court invalidated a state law that gave
employees an absolute right not to work on the Sabbath day of their choice. The
Court held that because the law applied "no matter what burden or inconvenience
this [absolute right] imposes on the employer or fellow workers,"24 the law violated
a "fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses."25 In expressing that principle,
the Court quoted Judge Learned Hand, who had written that "'[t]he First
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their own
interests others must conform to his own religious necessities."'26
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed its Caldor decision. In Cutter v.
Wilkinson,27 the Court rejected a facial challenge under the Establishment Clause
to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). That law
requires the government to show that any substantial burden on inmates' religious
exercise is necessary to achieve a compelling interest.28 Relying explicitly on Caldor,
a unanimous Court held that RLUIPA was permissible because it required courts
to "take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose
on nonbeneficiaries. "29 And because the accommodations contemplated under
RLUIPA would not impair the "significant interests" of third parties, such as
prison officials and other prisoners, the Court determined that the statute did not
conflict with the Establishment Clause.30
The Supreme Court's recent decisions involving religious accommodations are
consistent with the concern for third-party harms expressed in Caldor and Cutter.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court granted a religious exemption
to the contraception mandate hat the Obama administration had created under
authority given by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.31 The Court
made clear its expectation that the exemption would impose no burdens on third
parties, such as female employees who were otherwise entitled to seamless coverage
23 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
24 Id at 708-09.
25 Id at 710.
26 Id. (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
27544 U.S. 709 (2005).
2' 42 U.S.C. §2000cc (2006).
29544 U.S. at 720.
3 Id. at 722.
31 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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of contraception without cost sharing under their existing health insurance
policies.32 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito stated that "[t]he effect of the HHS-
created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby . . . would be
precisely zero."33 Similarly, in Hokt v. Hobbs, the Court granted a religious
exemption from a prison grooming policy, holding that state prison officials had
failed to show that the requested accommodation posed any safety or security
risks.34 In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg sharpened the point by
noting that "accommodating petitioner's religious belief would not detrimentally
affect others who do not share the petitioner's belief."35
In response to this line of precedent, running from Caldor through Hobby
Lobby and Hokt v. Hobbs, some critics of the third-party harm doctrine are
attracted to what might be called a BLbertarian view of the Supreme Court's cases
limiting religious accommodations. According to this view, the Establishment
Clause does not limit religious accommodations on the basis of third party harms.
The reason is that the government never establishes a religion when it acts to "leave
religion alone."36 The government can only violate the Establishment Clause,
including the third-party harm doctrine, when it actively promotes religion. We
call this view libertarian because it imagines a world without government
intervention, and it assumes that returning religious citizens to that state can never
count as an establishment. The upshot of this view is that most cases involving
religious accommodations will be insulated from review under the Establishment
Clause. Whenever the government lifts a burden it has created, any concerns about
effects on third parties will be matters of legislative discretion, rather than triggers
for judicial scrutiny.
The libertarian view rests on two main arguments. The first is that the
third-party harm doctrine does not apply to religious accommodations but only to
32 Id. at 2760. The Hobby Lobby majority addressed the issue of third-party harms in dicta, which
we discuss below (in Part III). It should be noted that the Court nevertheless affirmed a central holding
of Cutter and Caldor, by recognizing that "[i]t is certainly true that in applying RFRA 'courts must take
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries."' Id. at
2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 720).
33 It turned out that Justice Alito's claim was mistaken. After the Court's decision in HobbyLobby,
the government had to create new regulations to extend coverage to the employees of closely held,
for-profit corporations. Beginning at least with the Court's decision, but likely starting even earlier in
the litigation, and continuing until those regulations went into effect, thousands of employees who
worked for Hobby Lobby (and other companies involved in the litigation) were denied statutory
benefits. See TEBBE, supra note 3, at 51; Tebbe et al., Holt, supra note 3.
34 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
35 Id at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
36 Esbeck, supra note 5, at 359; see also Volokh, supra note 6 ("[Caldor] doesn't apply in situations
where . . . the government is lifting a legal obligation from private parties-even when this lifting of the
legal obligation means that other private parties will be worse off than if the legal obligation remained in
place.") (emphasis in the original).
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"naked religious preferences."3 7 The distinction between accommodations and
religious preferences is roughly this: the government accommodates when it lifts
burdens that the government itself has created, and it creates a preference when it
provides an advantage for religious believers that does not involve lifting a
government-imposed burden.38 For example, applying this distinction to Caldor,
Professor Esbeck argues that the state law granting employees an absolute right not
to work on their Sabbath day was a religious preference and not a religious
accommodation.39 And that is because the state provided employees with a benefit
that employers in the private market did not otherwise afford them. That benefit
did not result from lifting a regulatory burden that the government had imposed.
This was not the state "leaving religion alone," but rather the government
intervening in the private employer-employee relationship to give employees a
decisive advantage in exercising their religion.40
The second argument for the libertarian view is that that the Supreme Court
has clearly sanctioned third-party harms in cases involving religious
accommodations. The two main examples are Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
v. Amos" and Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v.
EEOC 4 2 In Amos, the Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to
Section 702 of Title VII,43 which provides an exemption allowing religious
organizations to discriminate with respect to religion in hiring and firing employees
whose work is connected with their activities.44 Similarly, in Hosanna-Tabor, the
Court held that houses of worship are protected by a constitutionally-grounded
"ministerial exception," which insulates them from anti-discrimination law when
making employment decisions involving clergy and other ministerial employees.45
In both Amos and Hosanna-Tabor, the Court recognized religious exemptions
that imposed clear harms on employees, who lost their jobs as a result of the
accommodations in question. In light of these outcomes, those attracted to the
libertarian view argue that the third-party harm doctrine cannot be reconciled with
37 Esbeck, supra note 5, at 363-69; see also DeGirolami, supra note 5 ("Thornton ... seem[s] to
suggest that the burden imposed on secular interests must be state-imposed."); cf. Berg, Rehgious
Exemptions, supra note 5, at 59 ("The strongest case for government to remove a burden on religion is
when government itself has created the burden . . . . In Caldor . .. the statute was simply reordering
interests among private employers . . . .").
3' Lund makes a similar distinction between advantaging religion and lifting a burden on it, but
only to differentiate our example (1) from example (2). See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. The
libertarian argument here is that a similar distinction also defeats third-party harm objections to example
(3), involving harms that fall on a discrete group. According to this argument, such harms can never be
objectionable when the government is merely lifting a burden that the government itself has imposed.
39 Esbeck, supra note 5, at 363-64.
4 Id. at 364.
41 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
42 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
43 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
44 483 U.S. at 336.
45 565 U.S. at 181.
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cases like Amos and Hosanna-Tabor. They claim that the doctrine must therefore
be limited in application to cases like Caldor, which involve religious preferences,
and not cases involving religious accommodations in which the government lifts
burdens that it has imposed.46
The problem with the libertarian view, at least as a matter of legal doctrine, is
that the Supreme Court has rejected it. Remember that the central claim of the
libertarian view is that the third-party harm doctrine applies, if at all, only to
religious preferences and not to religious accommodations that "leave religion
alone" by lifting government-imposed burdens. But this claim is directly
contradicted by Cutter v. Wilkinson, in which a unanimous Court held that the
Establishment Clause limits religious accommodations that do not account for the
interests of third parties.4 7
In Cutter, the Court began its analysis of RLUIPA by finding the statute
"compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise."48 That is, the Court
described RLUIPA as a classic religious accommodation, one that leaves religion
46 In Amos, the majority attempted to distinguish Caldor by relying on a similar distinction
between the government imposing a religious preference as opposed to lifting regulations that allow
private actors to burden others. Writing for the Court, Justice White reasoned that in Caldor, the state
"had given the force of law to the employee's designation of a Sabbath day and required accommodation
by the employer regardless of the burden which that constituted for the employer or other employees."
483 U.S. at 337 n.15. By contrast, in Amos, the employee's "freedom of choice in religious matters was
impinged upon, but it was the Church . . . and not the Government, who put him to the choice of
changing his religious practices or losing his job." Id.
In our view, Justice O'Connor offered the proper response to this distinction in her Amos
concurrence:
Almost any government benefit o religion could be recharacterized as simply "allowing" a
religion to better advance itself . . .. It is for this same reason that there is little significance to
the Court's observation that it was the Church rather than the Government that penalized
[the employee's] refusal to adhere to Church doctrine. The Church had the power to put [its
employee] to a choice of qualifying [religiously] ... or losing his job because the Government
had lifted from religious organizations the general regulatory burden imposed by § 702.
Id. at 347 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in the original). Furthermore, as
demonstrated above, see text accompanying notes 47-52, a unanimous Court in Cutter relied on Justice
O'Connor's reasoning-and declined to follow the Amos majority-when it applied Caldor under
circumstances in which the government had lifted a regulatory burden. 544 U.S. at 720. For further
argument on this point, see Schwartzman et al., Reconciling Amos, supra note 3 ("Not only is the Amos
majority's attempt to distinguish Caldor conceptually unsound, the Court has declined to follow it.");
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Inisible Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby
Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 62 (2014) ("When
exempted religious organizations religiously discriminate against employees after having been freed by
the government to do so, it makes utterly no sense to conclude that the government had no hand in
depriving those employees of their rights against religious discrimination. This is no doubt why the
Amos majority's 'distinction' of Caldor appears nowhere in Cutter v. Wilkinson. ); Gedicks & Van
Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 3, at 368 n.119.
47 544 U.S. at 720.
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alone by lifting a burden imposed by the government. To emphasize this point, the
Court cited to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Amos for the proposition
that "removal of government-imposed burdens on religious exercise is more likely
to be perceived 'as an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a
Government endorsement of religion."'49
After making and then reiterating the point that RLUIPA is an
accommodation that alleviates a government-imposed burden, the Court then
declared that RLUIPA "on its face does not founder on shoals our prior decisions
have identified: Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries."so And
for this proposition, the Court cited Cakior, which makes sense if that case stands
for the principle that the Establishment Clause forbids religious accommodations
that impose significant burdens on third parties.
The libertarian view cannot account for these holdings in Cutter. If Caldor is a
case about religious preferences, not religious accommodations, then the Cutter
Court should not have cited it in reviewing the constitutionality of RLUIPA under
the Establishment Clause. And yet, the Court clearly relied on Cakior in holding
that RLUIPA was facially constitutional under the Establishment Clause because
the statute requires courts to account for the interests of third parties in evaluating
claims for religious exemptions. Thus, whatever the normative merits of the
libertarian view,5 ' it is simply not an accurate statement of existing doctrine, which
holds that religious accommodations, including those that lift government burdens,
cannot "override other significant interests"52 of third parties without violating the
Establishment Clause.
So a central problem with the libertarian view is that, according to a unanimous
Supreme Court, the third-party harm doctrine applies to religious
accommodations. But this seems to leave a puzzle. What about Amos and
Hosanna-Tabo? These cases look like a problem for the third-party harm doctrine
because they recognize religious accommodations in which third parties, in fact,
suffer significant harms. The libertarian view resolves this apparent contradiction
by claiming that the third-party harm doctrine does not apply to religious
accommodations. But as we have seen, this is a doctrinal mistake. Indeed, as noted
above, in describing RLUIPA as lifting government-imposed burdens, the Court
cited to Amos and then, in the very next sentence, relied on Cakior for its holding
with respect to third-party nonbeneficiaries.53
As we have argued previously,54 there is a better way to explain the Court's
approach to Establishment Clause limits on religious accommodations, one that
49 Id. (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)).
50 d
s' And we deny these in Part III infra.
52 544 U.S. at 722.
5 Id. at 720.
5 Schwartzman et al., Reconciling Amos, supra note 3.
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can reconcile cases like Caldor and Cutter with cases like Amos and Hosanna-
Tabor. What the libertarian view fails to see is that Amos and Hosanna-Tabor do
not represent ordinary religious accommodations. Both cases are about the extent
to which religious organizations can control membership and leadership decisions.
The Court has recognized that religious organizations have powerful free exercise
and associational interests that generate a range of statutory and constitutional
protections against liability under antidiscrimination laws." Moreover, the harms
that the Court permits in these cases are closely connected to the right to exclude,
which is a core feature of the institutional autonomy that the Court has ascribed to
religious and other expressive associations.5 6
In drawing attention to this institutional aspect of Amos and Hosanna-Tabor,
we are not endorsing the Court's approach to defining the rights of religious
organizations in the context of anti-discrimination law. 5 7 We are merely observing
that cases like Amos and Hosanna-Tabor allow third party harms in a narrow
range of circumstances, namely, where religious organizations make internal
membership and employment decisions. Indeed, these are the only cases in which
the Court has ever granted religious exemptions while acknowledging significant
harms to others. Amos and Hosanna-Tabor define a limited category of
exemptions designed to protect the institutional autonomy of churches. When
described in this way, however, they no longer present a doctrinal challenge for the
third-party harm doctrine. Instead they stand for narrowly prescribed, institutional
exceptions from the general rule against third-party harms adopted by unanimous
courts in Caldor and Cutter.
Other things equal, we should prefer legal interpretations that reconcile cases
and show how they might cohere with one another.58 The doctrinal account that
we are advancing here is superior to the libertarian view in this respect because it
provides a better fit with the cases. It can explain the force of Amos and Hosanna-
Tabor, while showing that Caldor and Cutter nevertheless apply to rdinary
religious accommodations. Thus, unlike the libertarian view, our interpretation can
" See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring) ("Religious groups are the archetype
of associations formed for expressive purposes, and their fundamental rights surely include the freedom
to choose who is qualified to serve as a voice for their faith."). For an argument that tries to dismiss the
associational interests at work in Amos and Hosanna-Tabor, see Storslee, supra note 4 (manuscript 25-
27).
56 See TEBBE, supra note 3, at 80-97; Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and, Possibly the Tarpon
Bay Womens Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 3, at 77 (defending a limited right of "close associations" to discriminate in
membership and leadership decisions); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with
Compelled Association, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839, 841 (2005) (offering "a philosophical argument for a
robust right to freedom of social and expressive association (including the freedom to exclude unwanted
members)").
" Indeed, far from it. See TEBBE, supra note 3, at 88-97; Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 974-81 (2013).
s TEBBE, supra note 3, at 25-36 (discussing coherence in moral and legal reasoning).
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give full scope to all of these decisions without effectively abandoning a
fundamental principle of the Religion Clauses, namely, that third parties should
not be compelled to pay significant costs to support other citizens' religious
practices.
III. BASELINES
A related objection to the third-party harm doctrine focuses on what counts as
a harm for purposes of limiting religious exemptions. Some critics have argued that
when the government grants an exemption that results in the loss of a benefit that
the government itself provides, there is simply no harm to third-parties." This
argument assumes that religious accommodations precede any assessment of third-
party harms.60 The basic idea is that a law that imposes substantial burdens on
religious believers is, to that extent, impermissible, unless narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. And if the law is impermissible as
applied to religious believers, then any benefits the law provides to third parties are
wrongful gains. Those third parties were never entitled to such benefits in the first
place, so they cannot complain when the government takes them away.
To see the implications of this baselines objection, consider, for example, the
litigation over the federal contraception mandate in Hobby Lobby. Under
regulations enacted pursuant to the Affordable Care Act, Hobby Lobby's
employees were entitled to insurance coverage without cost-sharing for all forms of
female contraception approved by the FDA.6 But according to the baselines
objection, they were not, in fact, entitled to this benefit. That is because, under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),6 2 the contraception mandate was
impermissibly applied to religious employers, who had no obligation to provide
their employees with coverage for contraception. And since their employees were
59 See sources cited supra note 6.
6o Although they are ideologically aligned, the doctrinal objection discussed in Part II is not the
same as the baselines objection we address in this Part. The doctrinal objection advanced by the
libertarian view is that the government never violates the Establishment Clause when it lifts a burden
that it has imposed on religious believers. By contrast, the baselines objection is that the government
never harms an individual when it takes away a benefit it has provided. To see the difference between
these objections, consider a religious exemption from a prohibition on murder. According to the
doctrinal objection, this exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause because it lifts a burden
(i.e., the threat of criminal sanction) imposed on someone who murders because of their religious
commitments. Set aside for the moment the absurdity of this conclusion. The important point here is
the contrast with the baselines objection, which does not apply to this religious exemption. In allowing
religious believers to commit murder, the government does not take away a positive or regulatory benefit
it has provided. Instead, proponents of the baselines objection would say that the government allows a
harm to a pre-existing private right, which might indeed show a violation of the Establishment Clause.
In short, the doctrinal objection focuses on whether the government is lifting regulations, whereas the
baselines objection focuses on the whether the government provides the entitlement in question.
61 See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (describing contraceptive mandate under the ACA).
62 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.
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not entitled to such coverage in the first place, those employees suffered no harm
when their employers received a religious exemption from the mandate.63
We reject this baselines objection on both doctrinal and normative grounds. As
a doctrinal matter, courts have never evaluated claims for religious exemptions
against a baseline that assumes religious actors have a presumptive right to avoid
paying for government-mandated statutory benefits to third parties. The most
important example here is United States v. Lee, in which the Court refused a claim
for a religious exemption under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.64 In Lee, an Amish farmer objected on religious grounds to paying
social security taxes. Congress had granted an exemption for members of the
Amish community who were self-employed, but that exemption did not extend to
Amish who employed others, even within their own religious community. Lee
argued that the Free Exercise Clause required extending the existing exemption to
include him, so that he would not have to pay Social Security taxes for his
employees.6 s
Notice that according to the baselines objection, granting Lee's request would
not impose any harm on his employees. The government would merely extinguish a
benefit that it had provided. It would return employees to the status quo prior to
the existence of retirement benefits under the social security system. And if harms
were measured from that baseline, then Lee's religious exemption would not deny
his employees any benefits to which they were entitled.
As with the libertarian view discussed above, the doctrinal problem with this
reasoning is that the Supreme Court's decision in Lee repudiates it. Although the
Court applied a compelling interest analysis in evaluating Lee's claim,66 it rejected
his demand for a religious exemption precisely because that exemption threatened
to undermine the system of federal retirement benefits owed to employees. The
Court declared that "[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial
activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a
matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes
63 Professor Esbeck has made a version of this argument. Esbeck, supra note 5, at 370 ("The
baseline for measuring the relevant burdens and benefits on employers for purposes of the Establishment
Clause is just before the effective date of the ACA. Because RFRA saw to it that religious employers
were never religiously burdened by the ACA, there was no employer 'benefit' that could be said to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause."); see also Walsh, supra note 6 ("[I]f RFRA
requires an exemption to the contraceptives coverage mandate, then the supposed baseline ntitlement is
illegal."); Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, 2016 WL
183794, Zubik v. Burwell, at 5 (2016) ("[T]his Court's jurisprudence requires understanding RFRA as
preserving the rights of religious claimants and third parties as they were before the Affordable Care Act
burdened religion."); Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars et al., 2014 WL 356639, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., at 3-4 (2014) ("[The ACA] effectively incorporates RFRA's balancing test into its
own provisions . . . . [P]laintiffs' employees simply have no right to plaintiff-provided coverage under
the ACA regulations, and employees would not be burdened by plaintiffs' religious exercise.").
64 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
65 Id. at 260-61.
6 Id. at 258.
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which are binding on others in that activity. "67 Why not? Because, as the Court
continued, "[giranting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer
operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees."" And the
employer only imposes his faith on employees if those employees have some
entitlement to benefits that the employer may not deny them. In Lee, the Court
assumed a baseline in which third parties can be harmed by denying them statutory
benefits.9
We recognize that Hobby Lobby included dicta suggesting support for a
baselines objection to statutory benefits. Writing for a narrow majority, Justice
Alito addressed concerns about third party harms in footnote 37 of his opinion.
While conceding that, under Cutter, courts must take into account such harms, he
objected that "[bly framing any Government regulation as benefiting a third party,
the Government could turn all regulations into entitlements to which nobody could
object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless."70
As we have argued elsewhere, however, Justice Alito's dicta leaves open the
question of how to determine whether third parties have been harmed by a
religious exemption.7 ' If statutory benefits are not part of the baseline for
measuring harm, then there must be some other basis for deciding which
entitlements count. But Justice Alito provided no guidance on this point, nor is it
obvious how he might have done so, at least not in a manner consistent with the
Court's prior free exercise jurisprudence, which accepts regulatory baselines.
One possibility, which some scholars have recommended,72 is to collapse the
third-party harm doctrine into a compelling interest test. Third parties would be
able to object to an accommodation only if they suffered harms that the
government would have a compelling interest in preventing. But there are at least
three problems with this approach. First, in specifying what counts as a compelling
interest, the Court must refer to a background set of entitlements. Without a
baseline for determining what rights and benefits individuals are owed, courts
7 
Id. at 261.
6S Id.
69 We could make the same point using other cases. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v.
Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (rejecting religious exemption from minimum wage and other
provisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprise, Inc., 390 U.S. 400,
402 n.5 (1968) (rejecting religious exemption from prohibition on race discrimination in public
accommodations under Civil Rights Act of 1964).
70 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37.
" See Tebbe et al., When Do, supra note 3, at 340-45.
72 See, e.g., DeGirolami, supra note 5 ("Accommodations must pass the government compelling
interest threshold. If they do, they seem very much not to be violations of the Establishment Clause rule
laid out in [Caldor]."); Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars, supra note 63, at 3 ("There
is no support in constitutional doctrine or theory for an Establishment Clause limit on religious
exemptions that do not conflict with a government interest that is less than compelling."); Brief of
Constitutional Law Scholars et al., supra note 63, at 10 ("The balancing tests incorporated into statutes
like RFRA already provide courts ample opportunity to ensure that any given religious accommodation
will not overly burden a third party.").
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cannot evaluate the government's claim that it has a compelling interest in
protecting the rights or interests of third parties. Thus, to claim that third parties
can only raise claims when their interests are otherwise compelling does not avoid
the need to select an appropriate baseline.
Second, requiring third party harms to be independently compelling is too
stringent and also inconsistent with precedent.73 Consider, for example, the facts of
Cddor, in which employers complained that the state had burdened them by giving
employees an absolute right not to work on the Sabbath day of their choosing. It
seems improbable that the state had a compelling interest to prevent speculative
economic injuries or to protect what the Court described as the "convenience or
interests"74 of private employers. The employers' interests were not protected
because they were independently compelling. They prevailed because the
government was prohibited by the Establishment Clause from shifting significant
costs from religious employees to their employers.
A third reason to avoid conflating the third-party harm doctrine with a
compelling governmental interest test is that the government will not always be the
party objecting to a religious exemption. In Cddor, the Establishment Clause
challenge was brought by private employers. And they did not need to allege that
their interests were compelling for government purposes, only that they were
significantly burdened as a result of the government's religious accommodation. For
another example, consider recent litigation over interim rules adopted by the
Trump administration to provide exemptions from the federal contraception
mandate for employers who object on religious or moral grounds to paying for
contraception.75 Even if the administration argued that providing seamless and
cost-free coverage of contraception does not serve a compelling governmental
interest, employees would nevertheless have a claim that the exemption
significantly burdens them by failing to account for their interests and by depriving
them of a statutory benefit o which they would otherwise be entitled. The interest
of those burdened by a religious accommodation need not coincide with the
government's interests, whether or not compelling, in order to warrant protection
under the Establishment Clause. After all, the Establishment Clause protects the
religious freedom of private individuals, not only state actors.
Up to this point, our argument against the baselines objection has focused
mainly on doctrinal points. But there are also powerful normative reasons to reject
any account that refuses to take seriously the deprivations of statutory rights and
benefits that may follow from granting religious exemptions.76 One would have to
7 This paragraph draws on material from Tebbe et al., When Do, supra note 3, at 23.
7 472 U.S. at 709.
" See, e.g., California v. Health & Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 86 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
76 See Gedicks & Van Tassel, OfBurdens, supra note 5, at 332-33 (arguing that the adoption of a
"negative-liberty or libertarian baseline" would threaten to undermine a wide range of employment
laws); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Excrcise Lochnerisn, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1513-18 (2015)
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be deeply in the grip of libertarian theory to think that an employee who is denied
social security benefits is not harmed by that denial. Or that a female employee
who is denied contraceptive coverage is not thereby disadvantaged compared to
employees who receive that coverage. Or that a gay person who is denied services in
a public accommodation is not thereby harmed or demeaned by that refusal. It is,
of course, possible to recognize these harms and to argue that religious liberty is
sufficiently important to outweigh them.77 We think such a view is mistaken,78 but
at least it does not ignore, or dismiss by conceptual sleight-of-hand, the very real
costs that may follow from granting religious exemptions.
IV. No ACCOMMODATIONS?
A pervasive concern among critics is that the third-party harm doctrine will
eliminate all, or nearly all, religious accommodations.79  In responding to this
objection, it is important to draw some distinctions between different types of
accommodations. Two factors are especially salient: first, whether an
accommodation imposes significant costs on others, and, second, whether those
costs are imposed on particular individuals or on the public generally. These factors
allow us to distinguish three main categories of accommodations: (i) those that do
not impose significant costs on others; (ii) those that impose significant costs on
the public generally, and (iii) those that impose significant costs on particular
individuals. Accommodations in the last of these categories are the most
controversial, and we address some examples below. But accommodations in the
first two categories are common, relatively uncontroversial, and too often
overlooked in debates about third-party harms.
Any response to the objection that the third-party harm doctrine will eliminate
accommodations should begin by pointing out what should be obvious, which is
that many accommodations are harmless, in the sense that they, quite literally, do
not harm other people. For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger," an Orthodox
Jew sought an exemption from Air Force uniform regulations so that he could wear
(discussing the danger that adoption of a market baseline poses to employment and antidiscrimination
laws); Tebbe et al., W'hen Do, supra note 3, at 336 (arguing that "there is no natural baseline for
measuring benefits and burdens" and that "meaningful comparisons can only be made by considering the
substantive commitments at play in a particular dispute").
See Berg, Relgious Exemptions, supra note 5, at 52; Lund, supra note 7, at 1383-84.
s See Tebbe et al., How Much, supra note 3, at 219-33 (defending an "undue hardship" standard
for determining how much religious exemptions may burden third parties).
7 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 5, at 375 ("If the mere loss of [a] benefit is enough to categorically
defeat a religious exemption, few religious exemptions will survive."); Lund, supra note 7, at 1383
(noting that "many long-established exemptions impose real harm on others, or at least seem to do so"
and expressing concern that such exemptions would be impermissible under our theory); DeGirolami,
supra note 7 (arguing that "[v]irtually all accommodations impose harms or burdens of some kinds on
others" and would therefore be invalid under third-party harm doctrine).
so 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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a yarmulke. Although the Supreme Court deferred to the military and refused to
grant an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause,"' Congress responded by
passing legislation to permit members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel
unless doing so "would interfere with the performance of the member's military
duties."82 Similarly, in Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court granted an RLUIPA
exemption to allow a Muslim prisoner to wear a half-inch beard.3 In that case, the
Court rejected the state's claims that an exemption from prison grooming policies
would create safety or security concerns. And as noted above, Justice Ginsburg
wrote separately to underscore that this accommodation was consistent with the
Court's admonition in Cutter that courts take account of burdens on
nonbeneficiaries and that "an accommodation must be measured so that it does not
override other significant interests."84
Neither of the accommodations at issue in Goldman or Holt-nor those in
many other similar cases8s-should be controversial. And that is largely because
neither imposes any significant cost on third parties." Both cases involved
innocuous ritual practices that officials objected to by invoking claims of deference
and requirements of uniformity. But those claims were so weak that it is difficult
not to impute a sense of hostility toward religious minorities.7  Religious
accommodations like these promote inclusiveness and equality without burdening
third parties.
A second category of cases involves accommodations that impose costs on the
general public, but not on particular or identifiable third parties. We have already
mentioned the provision of kosher and halal meals for Jewish and Muslim
prisoners." Other cases involve religious accommodations granted to employees
who lost their jobs and were denied unemployment compensation benefits after
s' Id. at 507-08.
32 10 U.S.C. § 774. See Dwight Sullivan, The Congressional Response to Goldman v. Weinberger,
121 MIL. L. REV. 125 (1988).
135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
4 In her Holt concurrence, id at 867, Ginsburg cited to her dissent in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2790 n.8, which in turn relied on Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. The quote is from Cutter
" See James Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 2053
(2009) (surveying hundreds of RLUIPA prison accommodation cases).
36 Another set of cases in which courts have granted exemptions that do not harm others, or that
impose de minimis harms, involve Title VII's prohibition on religious discrimination, which requires
that employers provide their employees with reasonable accommodations. We have analyzed Title VII
accommodation cases under the third-party harm doctrine and argued that courts have generally
achieved workable and relatively uncontroversial decisions in that context. Tebbe et al., How Much,
supra note 3, at 219-28.
s" See also Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 367 (3d
Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (granting an exemption allowing Muslim police officers to wear beards and
suggesting that the Newark police department's refusal to do so was based on a purpose to "suppress
manifestations of the religious diversity that the First Amendment safeguards").
s See Taylor Stout, The Costs of Rehgious Accommodations in Prisons, 96 VA. L. REV. 1201,
1217 (2010) (discussing the costs of providing kosher meals and other prison accommodations).
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refusing to work on the Sabbath. In a series of free exercise decisions, the Supreme
Court held that states lacked compelling interests in forcing employees to choose
between receiving unemployment benefits and following their religious
commitments." And more recently, in Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court granted
a RFRA exemption from the contraception mandate on the assumption that the
government would, if necessary, pay the cost of extending coverage to those
employees affected by the accommodation."
We have argued that, both normatively and doctrinally, there is an important
distinction between accommodations that impose costs on the general public and
those that burden particular individuals. When the government lifts burdens to
protect religious liberty, and when those burdens are distributed across the general
population, the grounds for any individual to register a complaint are minimized.
In such cases, the costs of exemptions are socialized and impossible to trace back to
identifiable taxpayers. Of course, as we noted above, the government may not use
the public fisc to subsidize religion, rather than accommodating it, under the
Establishment Clause. But among accommodations there is a stark distinction
between those that impose costs on the public, many of which are relatively
uncontroversial, and those that burden specific individuals.
It is this last category of harmful accommodations that tend to generate the
most controversy. The exemptions within this category benefit particular religious
believers at the cost of specific and identifiable nonbeneficiaries. We have already
noted the example of United States v. Lee, which involved a religious objection to
paying social security taxes." That case was decided on free exercise grounds, but
the exemption claim would also have implicated the third-party harm doctrine.
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine a law that grants an employer an exemption
from having to pay for social security benefits. After the Court decided Lee,
Congress provided an exemption for Amish employers.92 But notably, that
exemption applies only where both the employer andthe employee share a religious
objection to paying social security taxes and where both formally request the
exemption.93 In other words, under the existing statutory exemption, employers are
not permitted to impose burdens on non-consenting employees. Any burdened
9 See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n of Fl., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2781-82 ("[B]oth RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some
circumstances require the Government . . . to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a
substantial burden on religious exercise.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). But cf id. at
2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[I]t is the Court's understanding that an accommodation may be made
to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or burden on the Government.").
91 See supra text accompanying note 64.
92 26 U.S.C. § 3127.
93 Id. (requiring as a condition of the employer's exemption that an employee file an "identical
application for exemption from the taxes imposed").
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employee would be a co-beneficiary of the exemption and so would not fall within
the third-party harm doctrine.
There are, however, some existing accommodations that do appear to violate
the doctrine. Critics have offered various parades of horribles, some longer than
others, claiming that the doctrine would eliminate all kinds of federal and state
religious accommodations.9 Many of the exemptions mentioned fall into the two
categories discussed above and so are not covered by the third-party harm doctrine.
But some of the remaining exemptions that impose significant costs deserve
additional scrutiny. Although we cannot survey all the possible cases here, perhaps
we can illustrate some aspects of the doctrine and its scope of application by
addressing a few paradigmatic examples.
We have already accounted for Amos and Hosanna-Tabor, which allow
religious organizations to avoid liability under antidiscrimination laws. These cases
have been understood to implicate constitutional values of institutional autonomy
and freedom of association. They do involve third-party harms, but they are
exceptional in this regard. There are no other cases in which the Supreme Court
has granted a religious exemption, statutory or constitutional, while acknowledging
the imposition of significant costs on identifiable non-beneficiaries."
A possible counter-example is the priest-penitent privilege.6 Although the
form and scope of this testimonial privilege varies by jurisdiction, some version of it
has been recognized in all fifty states and by the federal courts going back to the
nineteenth century.7 In cases where the privilege is invoked, the loss of testimony
9 See Esbeck, supra note 5, at 375-76; DeGirolami, supra note 7; Lund, supra note 7, at 1383-84.
9 Between 1963, when the Court adopted a compelling interest test under the Free Exercise
Clause, and 1990, when the Court abandoned that test for incidental burdens on religion, the Court
granted religious exemptions in only four of seventeen free exercise cases. SeeJames E. Ryan, Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1414
(1992). Three of those cases involved unemployment compensation benefits, in which the costs of
accommodation were borne by the public. The fourth case was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), which granted an exemption from compulsory education laws for Amish children over the age of
fourteen. Importantly, in granting the exemption, the Court denied that "any harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may
be properly inferred." Id. at 230. Butsee Storslee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 28) ("[T]he Court silently
accepted that its ruling might well deny schooling to an unwilling child, but nonetheless concluded that
the exemption was appropriate because it did not present 'any harm to the physical or mental health of
the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare' sufficient to constitute a compelling interest.
Once again, if the third-party thesis is right, Yoder seems to be wrong."); Gage Raley, Yoder Revisited:
Why the Landmark Amish Schooling Case Could-and Should-Be Overturned, 97 VA. L. REV. 681,
693-702 (2011) (arguing that the exemption granted in Yoder imposes significant harms on Amish
children).
96 See Lund, supra note 7, at 1383; see also Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars et al., supra note
63, at 15-16. For a helpful overview of the priest-penitent privilege, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 246-60 (2006).
97 See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person
Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege? 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1636-40 (2003)
(discussing history of the privilege and surveying its adoption in state and federal law).
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may be damaging or harmful to those against whom it is asserted." And in recent
years, use of the privilege has increased, in part because of child abuse reporting
requirements and cases involving molestation by clergy." At the same time,
however, invocation of the privilege is uncommon in absolute terms, and courts
frequently and increasingly deny assertions of it.'0 0 Furthermore, a number of states
have modified the privilege with respect to child abuse and other sexual crimes,
abrogating it either partially or entirely.'0 '
The priest-penitent privilege should be situated in the context of other
evidentiary privileges, such as those that apply to attorney advice, psychiatric
treatment, and spousal confidences. To the degree that the priest-penitent privilege
merely protects confidentiality in the same way as these other evidentiary rules, it
may not single out religion or conscience in a manner that is problematic.0 2 And to
98 There is an extensive law review literature discussing the priest-penitent privilege, especially in
the context of child abuse by clergy. See Rena Durrant, Where There is Smoke, Theres Fire (and
Brimstone): Is It Time to Abandon the Clergy-Penitent Privilege? 39 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1348
n.47 (2006) (collecting dozens of articles analyzing the privilege). Much of the existing literature is
devoted to arguing for either abandoning the privilege or qualifying it in cases involving abuse and other
forms of harmful conduct. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and
Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1892-93; Norman Abrams, Addressing the
Tension between the Clergy-Communicant Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State
Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127 (2003).
99 In percentage terms, the numbers have grown significantly since the 1980s, increasing in rate
from the 1990s through the present, with more than 320 cases reported by 2016. See Christine
Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1027-28 (2017). The privilege is
most often invoked in cases involving murder and sex crimes. Id. at 1028.
.oo Surveying over 700 state and federal cases, Christine Bartholomew reports that between 1835
and 1980, there were only 63 reported cases. Id. at 1027. Bartholomew also reports that in the majority
of criminal and civil cases, courts deny assertions of the privilege. Moreover, the success rate has fallen
over time, with brief exceptions, so that it was only twenty-six percent by 2016. Id. at 1028-29.
101 See Paul Winters, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests ofAt-Risk Children in
Conlict with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 190-91 (2012) (providing recent
survey of state reporting requirements and abrogation of priest-penitent privilege).
102 Although we are tentative on this point, the priest-penitent privilege might be distinguished
from other religious exemptions because, as a confidentiality rule, it changes the baseline for the
production of information in the priest-penitent relationship. It is the denial of information that harms
third parties, but that very information may not exist without the privilege. After all, the point of the
privilege is to encourage communication by ensuring confidentiality. Thus, the priest-penitent privilege
may differ from other religious accommodations in how it affects the baseline of benefits and burdens
for third parties. Most regulatory exemptions are not conditions for the production of benefits. Consider
the exemption from the contraception mandate in Hobby Lobby If the exemption is granted,
employees lose part of their insurance coverage, and if the exemption did not exist, employees would
receive that coverage. But with respect to the priest-penitent privilege, if the exemption did not exist, it
is not clear that third parties would have access to the information they seek, which might only be
produced in a world that contains the privilege.
It is, however, a difficult empirical question whether third parties would benefit generally from
abrogation of the privilege. If penitents would no longer communicate sensitive information, then it is
possible that systematic abrogation of the privilege would not, in fact, protect the interests of third
parties. See Abrams, supra note 98, at 1150-51 (arguing that abrogation of the privilege would deter
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the degree that the confessional privilege works like other privileges to allow
citizens to discover and develop their deepest commitments, it may fall into the
exception for close associations.'03 But to the extent that the priest-penitent
privilege deviates significantly from other evidentiary privileges, especially in the
direction of allowing greater harms, legislatures and courts ought to scrutinize the
privilege to determine whether the law impermissibly favors belief at the expense of
third parties and in violation of the Establishment Clause.
In cases where the priest-penitent privilege imposes significant harms, courts
should skeptically inspect its application for violations of the third-party harm
doctrine. In the most egregious cases, as in criminal and civil cases involving child
abuse, state abrogation of the privilege might be required to comply with the
principles stated in Caldor and Cutter. And in cases where lesser harms are
contemplated, we think courts ought to take into consideration the interests of
third parties in balancing the value of confidentiality protected by the privilege.
Of the counter-examples that have been pressed against the third-party harm
doctrine, the most difficult are military draft exemptions.'04 Such exemptions have
existed in the United States going back to the colonial period.' Federal law has
provided for conscientious objectors since the first federal draft during the Civil
War. In the twentieth century, Congress liberalized conscientious objector
provisions, and during the Vietnam era, the Supreme Court's decisions in United
States v. Seeget06 and Welsh v. United States7 interpreted those provisions
broadly to cover those with unorthodox religious views and secular ethical
objections to military service.
Military draft exemptions are a challenge for the third-party harm doctrine
because those who are exempted impose burdens on those who take their place.
Presumably, for every objector who does not serve, the government must find
substitutes. And those who are then required to serve can complain that they
should not have to bear the costs of others' religious convictions. The fact that
legislatures and courts do not recognize this complaint and indeed persist in
penitent disclosures to clergy); but see Bartholomew, supra note 99, at 1032-48 (questioning the
empirical claim that the privilege promotes priest-penitent communication).
103 See infra text accompanying notes 52-58.
104 See, e.g., Lund, supra note 7, at 1384 ("Religious conscientious objectors have long been
protected from the draft, but if objectors are replaced by drafted substitutes, that third-party burden is
extraordinary."); Esbeck, supra note 5, at 376 ("For every conscientious objector excused from service,
another unwilling soldier is pressed into military service with the risk of injury or death."); Brief of
Constitutional Law Scholars et al., supra note 63, at 15 ("During the Vietnam era, the Court repeatedly
upheld the selective service exemption for conscientious objectors, even though the exemption was
facially limited to those whose objections were based on a belief in a 'Supreme Being,' and when an
exemption for one otherwise eligible draftee necessarily sent another one to war.").
105 See GREENAWALT, supra note 96, at 50.
106 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
107 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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granting exemptions to conscientious objectors implies rejection of the third-party
harm doctrine.
There are several responses to this objection based on military draft exemptions.
Some proponents of the third-party harm doctrine-including one of us'0 -have
argued that draft exemptions are distinguishable because they cannot be said to
impose substantial harms on identifiable third parties. Draftees may be ineligible
for any number of reasons, including medical conditions and student status. For
any particular draftee, it may be impossible to draw a causal connection between
being sent to the battlefield and another citizen's conscientious objection. There are
too many confounding factors for any draftee to complain that he is being put in
harm's way because ofthe government's accommodation of another's conscientious
objection.
Another response is that the increased risk of harm is too small. When
conscientious objectors exit the draft, they raise the statistical probability of others
being drafted. But the additional risk may be infinitesimal. In this way, draft
exemptions are more like tax subsidies for religious accommodations imposed on
the general public than they are like denials of significant benefits to particular
individuals. Because the risk of harm is small and diffuse, it does not trigger the
third-party harm doctrine.'
In his thoughtful contribution to this symposium, William Marshall casts doubt
on these responses."0 He notes that during Vietnam, the number of conscientious
10s TEBBE, supra note 3, at 58; see also Nelson Tebbe, Reply: Conscience and Equality, 31 J. C.R.
&ECoN. DEVEL. 1, 29 (2018).
109 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions, supra note 3, at 363-64 ("[E]xemption from
the draft for religious pacifists increases the mathematical likelihood that nonpacifists and secular
pacifists will be drafted in their place . . . The risk of being drafted already exists and is already
substantial . . . The additional burden imposed by accommodating religious pacifists . . . is barely
measurable; those accommodated are so few compared to the entire population subjected to the law that
it is not reasonable to understand the xemption as a meaningful third-party burden."); see also Gedicks
& Koppelman, supra note 46, at 57 ("Like the incremental tax increase in Walz, the religious pacifist
exemption barely increased an already-existing burden that was substantial in its own right and thus did
not impose significant additional costs on others in violation of the Establishment Clause. Although
whoever was drafted in place of the objectors faced the consequence of going to war, the pre-existing
probability of those persons' being drafted was not significantly increased by the exemption."); cfi Lund,
supra note 7, at 1378 ("Perhaps religious draft exemptions can be explained the same way. The
likelihood of you being drafted because someone else got an exemption is infinitesimal; it is barely more
than the risk you had originally of being drafted.").
110 William P. Marshall, Third-Party Burdens and Conscientious Objection to War, 106 KY. LJ.
685, 705-06 (2018); see also Storslee, supra note 4 (manuscript at 30 & n.130 (citing Marshall)).
Marshall also argues that the third-party harm doctrine was not historically a source of objection to
military draft exemptions. Marshall, supra, at 687-89. Yet, as he observes, draft exemptions in wars that
required universal military service, such as the Revolutionary War and the two World Wars, did not
impose on third parties the cost of having to serve in the military. That is because all able-bodied men
had to serve. That is not to say that conscientious objection was embraced-far from it. As Marshall
notes, fairness objections were often leveled against conscientious objectors. Id at 691-92. Third-party
harm arguments may not have been made in their contemporary form, but that is not surprising. If
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objectors rose dramatically, to the point where they outnumbered draftees inducted
into the military."' The numerical structure of the draft lottery also made it
possible to determine with some accuracy which third parties were burdened by
those opting for conscientious objector status. The combination of the sheer
number of objectors and the transparency of the draft mechanism together make
the argument from diffusion more difficult to sustain.
Another response, which Professor Marshall suggests, is that conscientious
objections to military combat may be sui generis as a form of religious
accommodation. Not only is there a long and unbroken history of granting draft
exemptions, but deference to the military and prudential concerns about coercing
objectors into fighting may be sufficient to distinguish this type of accommodation.
It may be futile to force objectors into combat roles, and indeed doing so may
impose further costs on those who are willing to serve.112
Nevertheless, to the extent conscientious objectors to military service impose
harms on identifiable third parties, others can rightfully complain about the fairness
of having to carry those burdens."3 We suspect that if there were a military draft in
the future, especially one in which there were more objectors than those entering
service, arguments sounding in the unfairness of third-party harms would be front
and center in debates about the legal and moral permissibility of continued
exemptions."4
everyone is required serve, the unfairness of conscientious objection lies not in forced substitution but in
not doing one's part and in increasing the burdens on those who serve.
... Id. at 697.
112 Id. at 715-16. For an argument that futility can ground a moral reason to accommodate
conscientious objections, see Simon Cabulea May, Contempt, Futility, and Exemption, in RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTIONS 60 (Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber eds., 2018).
113 When the numbers of conscientious objectors to war are small and from insular communities,
like the Quakers in the United States, accommodations are relatively costless. But when such
accommodations become more commonplace-in some cases reaching a significant minority or majority
of eligible inductees-costs increase significantly and arguments about fairness become more salient. For
example, the Israeli Supreme Court has struggled repeatedly with religious exemptions to compulsory
military service in that country. It ruled last year that exemptions from military service for the ultra-
Orthodox are unconstitutional. See Isabel Kershner, Israes Mitary Exemption for Ultra-Orthodox Is Rule
Unconstitutional N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/middleeast/israel-ultra-orthodox-miitary.html; see also
George Klosko, Michael Keren, & Stacy Nyikos, Political Obhligation andMilitary Scrrcein Three CountNes,
2 POL. PHIL. EcON. 37 (2003) (discussing arguments from fairness and reciprocity in legal justifications
for mandatory military service in Germany, Israel, and the United States).
114 Another example that is sometimes raised by critics of the third-party harm principle is the tax
exemption for nonprofits. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars et al., supra note 63, at 16 (arguing
in a single sentence that "the Court upheld a New York City real property tax exemption for religious
houses of worship, notwithstanding the cost imposed to taxpayers"). This example is inapposite for
several reasons. First, the associated costs are shouldered by the taxpaying public, not by an identifiable
subset of citizens. As we have argued above, that distinction matters. See supra text accompanying notes
18-22. Second, in upholding the New York property tax exemption, the Court emphasized that the
exemption was not specific to religion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 672-
73 (1970) ("[The government] has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even
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V. LEVELING UP
Some have argued that the military draft exemptions do not impose third-
party harms because they apply to non-religious objectors as well. This is the
"leveling-up" argument against the third-party harm doctrine. According to this
understanding, the ffect of the Court's decisions in Seeger and Welsh was to
expand the scope of religious accommodations to include secular claims of
conscience. As a result, the exemptions no longer favor religion, and those
burdened cannot complain that they are forced to bear the costs of others' religious
practices. When exemptions are generalized-when the government "levels up"
nonreligious claims so that they receive the same protections as religious claims-
the government does not treat religion distinctively, which means that religion
clause limitations cease to apply."5
Does the "leveling up" response to the military draft exemptions work? Does it
save them from normative and legal objections over third-party harms? The
question applies to other accommodations as well. For example, the Trump
administration may have attempted to forestall the third-party harm argument
when it coupled a religious exemption from the contraception mandate with a
similar exemption for employers who opposed the mandate on secular moral
grounds."' And some have defended vaccination exemptions that apply not only to
religious objectors but to those with "philosophical" or "moral" objections as well."7
The difficulty with the "leveling up" argument is that it does not track the
reasons why we have a principle against third-party harms in the first place. As we
explained above, the doctrine is driven by concerns about infringement of the
fundamental right to liberty of conscience, as well as concerns about stratified
citizenship status on the basis of a basic identity characteristic."' Both of those
concerns apply equally to government accommodations that cover both religious
and nonreligious objections to regulations that implicate people's most profound
commitments.
Citizens who are made to bear a cost so that the government may
accommodate a commitment of conscience have reason to complain that they are
churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class
of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries,
playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups."). Even if the third-party harm
doctrine applies to government accommodations of religion and conscience, tax exemptions extend to
nonprofits that engage in charitable activities not related to religion or conscience. For any or all of these
reasons, the widespread practice of exempting nonprofits from taxation does not push against our
argument.
115 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 8, at 1226.
116 Another reason the administration might have added an exemption for moral objections is to
counter a complaint that accommodating only religious convictions was unfair or unequal. See March
for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 122 (D.D.C. 2015).
117 Levin, supra note 8, at 1234.
.. s See infra Part I.
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being forced to "pay for" the beliefs of another, and that complaint does not
necessarily lose force just because the beliefs or practices at issue are not religious.
Similarly, citizens may well suffer degradation of their standing in the political
community on the basis of profound aspects of their identity that are connected to
nonreligious objections.
For an example, consider March for Life v. Burwell." In that case, a secular
pro-life nonprofit organization sought an exemption from the contraception
mandate that was similar to the exemption that the administration had granted to
religious organizations. Under the law as it stood, in fact, religious pro-life
organizations could take advantage of an existing accommodation, but secular
pro-life organizations could not, even if their beliefs and their work were otherwise
indistinguishable. The court ruled that the disparity between religious and secular
prolife nonprofits violated equal protection. Whether that ruling was correct is not
the point here.120 Rather, we mean to ask whether a rule that did exempt both types
of organizations would implicate the third-party harm doctrine.
It would. Not only would employees who lose contraception coverage without
cost sharing have reason to complain that they were being forced by the
government to bear costs so that others' fundamental beliefs could be
accommodated, but they also would justifiably perceive that the government was
favoring beliefs of the organizations over their own concerns about matters of
ultimate importance. Where life and death are involved, as well as matters of bodily
integrity, it is possible and even easy to understand how third parties could be
harmed in their liberty of conscience regardless of whether the accommodation is
granted for conduct motivated by religious convictions or whether it accommodates
comparable secular ethical or moral commitments.
Another way to understand our objection to the "leveling up" argument is by
returning to the example of military draft exemptions. Recall that the exemptions
apply to secular claims of conscience because, in Seeger and Welsh, the Court
interpreted the definition of religion broadly to include what would otherwise have
been considered nonreligious ethical and moral convictions. But notice that this
"definitional strategy" achieves equality between religious and secular claims of
conscience by bringing secular claims within the ambit of existing religious
exemptions. In other words, it treats secular claims as if they are religious. But a
result of this strategy is the exemptions remain religious and therefore subject to
scrutiny under the Establishment Clause, including limitations based on third-
party harms. And from a normative perspective, that result should not be
surprising. When conscience-based exemptions impose harms on others, third
parties have the same complaint that they have when the harms are imposed under
a narrow definition of religion, namely, that they should not be required to pay for
119 128 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. 2015).
120 Another court has since ruled the other way in a similar case. Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec'y
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 349-52 (3d Cir. 2017).
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costs associated with allowing someone else to comply with their deepest religious,
philosophical, or ethical convictions. Even after "leveling up," the third-party harm
doctrine ought to apply, doctrinally and normatively, with equal force to religious
and secular claims of conscience.
VI. THE COST OF RIGHTS
A final objection to the third-party harm doctrine is that rights of religious free
exercise are like other constitutional rights that result in harms to others. The
exercise of rights such as freedom of speech, the right to keep and bear arms, rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right not to self-incriminate
sometimes impose harms on others. With respect to these rights, however, the law
tolerates significant third-party harms. The objection, then, is that the same is, and
ought to be, true for religious liberty.'2 '
In considering the force of this objection, it may be useful to have more specific
examples. Consider free speech doctrine, which protects the speech of hateful
speakers who convey messages of intolerance, intimidation, and violence.122 These
messages are not only offensive, but they create social conditions in which the
targets of hateful and violent speech are made less secure and more vulnerable to
attack. Or consider First Amendment limits on defamatory speech. The United
States is unusual in providing speakers with immunity from tort liability that would
require them to pay damages when they negligently defame public officials.123 Yet
another example involves limiting speakers' liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when their speech is about matters of public concern.124 In all
these cases-involving hate speech, defamation, and speech that inflicts emotional
distress-the First Amendment allows speakers to impose harms on identifiable
third parties. As a result of free speech doctrine, some victims who would otherwise
be owed damages do not receive them because speakers have exercised their
constitutional rights.
Now, proponents of free speech argue that to have a free and tolerant society
requires a broad conception of freedom of speech. And they often argue that a
consequence of this freedom is that some people will be harmed. Such harms are
unavoidable if free speech is to be protected as a special constitutional right. As
Leslie Kendrick has argued recently, for many free speech theorists, the guarantee
is significant precisely because it protects a class of activities that includes harmful
expressive conduct. If the freedom of speech did not protect such conduct, the right
would have little, if any, meaning.125
121 See Esbeck, supra note 5, at 358 n.7; Lund, supra note 7, at 1384-85.
122 See RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
123 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
124 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
125 See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Rght, 45 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 96 (2017)
("[S]ome theorists argue that the class of protected activities must include harmful conduct, or else the
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The same argument is made now in the context of religious freedom. To have a
free and tolerant society requires accommodating religion. A broad conception of
religious liberty reduces social divisiveness and lessens the cruelty of the state
toward believers who would otherwise be forced to choose between following their
consciences and obeying the law.126 Thus, just as freedom of speech has important
public benefits, so, too, does religious freedom. And, to continue the analogy, these
benefits have attendant costs, which specific third parties are sometimes required to
pay. If we recognize that the value and benefit of free speech has such costs, then
we should do the same for religious freedom. There is no reason to single out
religious freedom as the one right for which it is impermissible to impose
significant costs on others.
We have two main responses to this objection about he cost of rights. The first
is that even if some rights impose harms on third parties, rights involving claims of
conscience are distinctive. That is because harms that follow from such exemptions
also implicate the liberty of those who are burdened. When third parties complain,
their objection is that the state is requiring them to subsidize another's
commitments of conscience. And that claim also sounds in the value of a
fundamental liberty. In short, when religious exemptions generate harms to third
parties, there is liberty of conscience on both sides.
Moreover, the First Amendment provides a textual marker for this difference
between religious freedom and other constitutional rights, such as the freedom of
speech. That marker, of course, is the Establishment Clause, which sets limits on
how the government can accommodate religious free exercise. Religious freedom
may be unusual in this respect. When the government goes too far in exempting
religion, it may violate the rights of third parties not to have the religious beliefs
and practices of others imposed upon them. And that claim, to be free from
religious domination, is itself a right of religious freedom.127
Religious freedom is not the only right that may conflict with other rights,
such that there are rights claims on both sides. Liberty of conscience will present
similar concerns, even when it is not grounded in religion, as we have argued
above.128 And conceivably other rights have a similar conceptual structure. But a
challenge for critics of the third-party harm doctrine is to identify cases in which
there are rights that conflict and in which those cases are relatively easily resolved
in favor of those imposing on the rights of others. Perhaps there are such cases, but
idea of free speech has no meaning. If a general liberty right already protects all harmless conduct, then a
free speech right must do something more.") (emphasis in original and internal citation omitted).
126 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Rehgious Liberty as Liberry, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313,
317 (1996).
127 TEBBE, supra note 3, at 53.
121 See also Tebbe, supra note 108, at 28-30 (arguing that some accommodations of nonreligious
commitments raise the same kinds of normative concerns about third-party harms that religious
exemptions do, such as accommodations of conscience, but that not all protections for speech implicate
those concerns).
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they are unlikely to be easily resolved. Even in a system that prioritizes rights over
other considerations, rights must be limited when they cannot be protected in a
manner consistent with granting equal rights to others. And that is the situation in
the context of religious freedom, where the rights of those claiming exemptions
conflict with the rights of others to be free from having others' religious practices
imposed upon them.
This first response to the cost of rights objection focuses on the nature of
religious liberty and one way in which that liberty may be distinguished from
others. But a second response, which applies to constitutional rights more
generally, is that we should be disturbed by the claim that individual rights can be
exercised in ways that harm others. An important principle in the liberal tradition
is that individual rights may extend up to the point at which they harm others, but
no further.129 This principle remains controversial, but its broad appeal may also
help to explain why applications of rights that harm others are so contentious. One
reason why most liberal democracies have not followed American free speech
doctrines in the areas of hate speech, defamation, and offensive speech aimed at
inflicting emotional distress is that these doctrines allow significant harms to third
parties.
Even if we are committed to protective doctrines, such as the defamation
standard under New York Times v. Sullivn,'30 we should still be concerned about
who pays for the costs of harmful rights. As Frederick Schauer has argued, "It
ought to be troubling whenever the cost of a general societal benefit must be borne
exclusively or disproportionately by a small subset of the beneficiaries."'3' It is
possible to recognize that rights protect important interests and public goods, while
also regretting that they impose serious costs on others, including on those who are
not well-positioned to bear those costs or to resist their imposition.
At this point, those concerned about both protecting rights and avoiding
harms to others would seem to face a dilemma. It is possible either to (1) protect
the right and impose costs on third parties, or (2) restrict the right and avoid
imposing costs on third parties. But it should be clear that these are not the only
available options. As Schauer observes, in many cases, it is also possible to
"uncouple" protection of a right from the harms it imposes on others by requiring
the public to compensate those who are harmed. There are various ways to
129 The classic statement of this principle is John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY, in 18 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL: ESSAYS ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY 213 (John M.
Robson ed., 1977), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/233. There is, of course, a vast literature
surrounding the harm principle, its meaning, scope, justification, and limitations. See, e.g., JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984); David Lyons,
Libertyand Harn to Others, 9 CAN. J. OF PHIL. 1 (1979). Our purpose here is not to defend a specific
account of the harm principle, but only to observe that claims to limit rights on the basis of third-party
harms are familiar and not easily dismissed within the liberal rights tradition.
130 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
131 Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1321, 1322 (1992).
Vol. Io6810
The Costs of Conscience
distribute the costs of protecting rights, including through social insurance or
victim compensation schemes.13 2
Lest these options seem far-fetched, it should be noted that the only examples
in which the Supreme Court has granted religious exemptions involve cost-
spreading of this kind. In a line of cases beginning with Sherbert v. Verne 33 and
extending through Frazee v. Illinois Department of Emploment Security'34 the
Supreme Court held that religious believers cannot be forced to choose between
receiving employment benefits and following the dictates of their consciences. In
these cases, however, the costs of religious accommodation were borne not by
employers or other identifiable third parties, but rather by the general public. The
costs were distributed across society rather than concentrated on particular
employers. The contrasting case, of course, is Caldor,'35 in which a state required
employers to bear potentially significant costs. And that case, as we have argued
above, stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause bars the imposition
of serious burdens on third parties.
Note that the result in Hobby Lobby tracks Sherbert and its progeny. The
Court granted a RFRA exemption for religious employers who objected to the
contraception mandate, but it did so on the assumption that there would be no cost
to third parties. The government would require insurance providers (or
administrators of self-insured plans) to guarantee contraceptive coverage for
employees. The Court's suggestion in Hobby Lobby was that religious employers
would be exempt, employees would receive coverage, and, if necessary, insurers
would be reimbursed by offsets in fees owed to the government. Any resulting costs
of the religious accommodation would be paid ultimately by the general taxpayer.'36
The Trump administration has rejected the Court's approach. Under its
interim final regulations granting sweeping exemptions from the contraception
mandate, neither insurance providers nor the government are required to remedy
the loss of coverage for employees.13 7 If these regulations are permitted to go into
132 Id at 1338-48 (considering insurance and victim compensation schemes in the contexts of libel
and defamation).
133 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
134 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
135 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
136 That insurers could recover their costs from the government was implied by the Court's
suggestion that the existing nonprofit exemption could be extended to cover closely-held for-profits.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2782. Under the nonprofit exemption, third-party administrators
were required to provide costless contraceptive coverage. They could then seek reimbursement from
insurers, who could in turn offset their costs by adjustments to user fees paid for participation in
federally-facilitated exchanges. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.50 (d); see also Coverage of Certain Preventive
Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,880 (July 2, 2013), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-02/pdf/2013-15866.pdf (explaining reimbursement
process for third-party administrators and insurers under the nonprofit exemption).
137 82 Fed. Reg. 47792 (Oct. 6, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 47838 (Oct. 6, 2017).
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effect,'38 they will impose substantial harms on employees. The result will be to
move, regressively, from a legal exemption regime in which costs are socially
insured to one in which those who are least able to pay are required to bear the
costs of accommodation for religious or moral objections.
The larger point here is that forcing third parties to pay for the exercise of
others' constitutional rights is disturbing. Moreover, the fact that some rights have
costs should not be a source of complacency in considering the distribution of those
costs. That rights have costs does not mean that third parties must bear them.
Indeed, as we have argued, courts have uncoupled or detached rights of religious
freedom from the costs imposed by the exercise of those rights. They have done
this mainly by requiring that the public cover those costs. But importantly, when
this uncoupling of rights and costs has not been possible, courts have denied
religious exemptions, rather than allow the imposition of significant burdens on
third parties.
CONCLUSION
The third-party harm doctrine is an important constitutional limit on religious
accommodations. Although critics have leveled a diversity of objections against it,
none of these is persuasive. There remain important questions about how much
harm religious accommodations may impose, but there should be no doubt that the
Religion Clauses, and especially the Establishment Clause, require that courts
closely scrutinize exemptions that impose significant costs on others. Many
accommodations will pass such scrutiny, but not all. Within limits, when
exemptions do impose serious burdens, the public must take responsibility for
them. It is neither legally nor morally permissible to require that third parties bear
the costs of conscience.
138 Two federal courts have granted preliminary injunctions blocking these regulations. California v.
Health & Human Servs, 281 F. Supp. 3d 86 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d
553 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
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